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SECOND THOUGHTS ON JOINT 
CHILD CUSTODY: ANALYSIS OF 
LEGISLATION AND ITS 




There is cUrrently a growing and disturbing national trend 
away from the traditional sole custody resolution toward award-
ing custody of children to both parents jointly.l This trend is 
most visible in state legislatures where, in less than three years, 
almost every state has considered joint custody legislation.-
The trend toward joint custody represents a significant 
change in legal and mental health professional theories regard-
ing child custody. Heretofore, stability and continuity in the 
child's family environment were the primary factors governing 
custody determinations. a However, under joint custody the con-
tinued relationship between the child and the noncustodial par-
ent becomes paramount.· This shift in emphasis is remarkable 
• c 1981. National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., 799 Broadway, Room 
402, New York, N.Y. 10003 . 
•• Sta1f Attorney, National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc . 
... Law Student, Hofstra University School of Law, New York 
1. Freed & Foster, Diuorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August I, 1980,6 
FAIl. L. REP. (BNA) 4043,4047 (1980); see 0180, Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable 
Alternative, 15 'I'luAL MAGAZINE, May 1981, at 26, 27 [hereinafter cited as Viable 
Alternative). 
2. See infra Section n. This article was originally prepared in July 1981. The status 
of legislation and statutes has been updated as of March 1982. 
3. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 699 (1950); Moninger v. Moninger, 202 Neb. 494,499, 276 
N.W.2d 100, 104 (1979) (one of the primary objectives after the dissolution of a marriage 
is to create a stable atmosphere for the children). See 0180 In re Lang, 9 A.D.2d 401, 193 
N.Y.S.2d 763, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71, 166 N.E.2d 861 (1960) (upholding 
traditional regard for stability). 
4. Memorandum in support of S. 7964/ A. 9369, 203th Legis., 1980 Seas. (New York's 
first joint custody bill) (failed). See also CAL. elV. CoDB § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982) 
(legislative finding and declaration that it is the public policy of the State to assure 
539 
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in light of the fact that there have been no reliable studies and 
little is known of the effects of joint custody on children. a 
Joint custody is not a new concept. In the past it was 
viewed with caution and as an exception to the traditional sole 
custody resolution. Today, legal experts still acknowledge that, 
because joint custody requires divorced spouses to cooperate and 
interact on an ongoing basis, only a small percentage of families 
qualify for it.- By contrast, the current joint custody trend seeks 
legislatively to mandate joint custody as the u norm," if not pre-
ferred, resolution. This shift in policy absent studies on the ef-
fects of joint custody on children is ill-advised and suspect. 
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze joint 
custody legislation and its implications for future custody litiga-
tion. However, discussion of joint custody must include an 
awareness of who its proponents are and their motivations, as 
well as the effect it will have on the lives of women who remain 
the primary caretakers of children, for u[i)n the background of 
the arguments over joint custody lies the age old 'battle of the 
sexes' and the current change in lifestyles."" That the current 
joint custody trend is a bacldash to the feminist movement and 
women's struggle for an identity in addition to that of mother 
and homemaker becomes apparent from an analysis of the legis-
lation being introduced and enacted in the name of joint 
custody. 
I. THE LEGAL MEANINGS OF "JOINT CUSTODY" 
The legal term "custody" generally denotes both legal and 
physical custody. "Legal" custody is the right or authority of a 
parent, or parents, to make decisions concerning the child's up-
children "frequent and continum, contact with both puente after the parente have sepa-
rated or dissolved their marriage"), and CAL CIV. CoM I 46OO(b) (West Supp. 1982) 
(parent which is more likely to allow "frequent and CODtilluing contact" with noncus-
todial parent is a factor to be considered ill determilliDg which parent is to be awarded 
sole custody). 
o. Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: Legialatiue Re/orm, 16 TJu.u. MAOAZINB, June 
1980, at 22, 27 (hereillafter cited as Legialatiue Re/orm]i J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 
255 (W. Va. S. Ct. 1978)i Williama v. Williama, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 10, coL 4 
("[T]here is no definitive evidence to demonatrate that BUch concepts are generally via-
ble in that it provides the beat basis for the health development of the child."). 
6. Viable Altematiue, supra note I, at 31. 
7. Legislative Reform. supra note 5, at 27. 
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bringing. e Legal custody includes the right to make decisions re-
garding the child's residency, education, religious training, medi-
cal care, discipline, etc.· The legal custodian has the right to 
institute legal action on behalf of the child and to enter into 
settlements or contracts on behalf of the child.1o .Physical cus-
tody is the right to physical possession of the child, i.e., to have 
the child live with the physical custodial parent. The physical 
custodian is charged with carrying out the day-to-day responsi-
bilities of childrearing.ll A legal custodian does not, by defini-
tion, have to be the physical custodian in order to retain and 
exercise decision-making authority or rights. 11 
During the ongoing marriage and prior to a court order, 
both parents have equal legal and physical custody rights; they 
stand as co-custodians. Upon divorce or separation, the tradi-
tional resolution of child custody matters by courts has been the 
"sole custody-visitatipn" order, wherein one parent (the custo-
dial parent) is vested with the legal and physical custody of the 
child. This parent, while given the exclusive decision-making au-
thorityor rights, is concurrently charged with the full responsi-
bilities for the day-to-day care of the child (i.e., physical cus-
tody). The other (non-custodial) parent's rights with respect to 
the child are generally limited to "visitation."11 That parent's 
responsibility is basically financial support of the child in the 
8. Id. at 24j Nielson, Joint Custody: An AlternatilJe for DilJorced Parents, 26 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1084. 1087 (1979). 
9. Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617. 262 P.2d 6, 16 
(1953)j Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 408 (1978)j See also Abar-
ganel, Shared Parenting After Separation and DilJorce: A Study of Joint Custody, 49(2) 
AM. J. OtmtOPSYCH. 320 (1979). 
10. Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953). 
11. Bruch, Making Visitation Work: Dual Parenting Orders, FAM. L. ADvoc., Sum-
mer 1978, at 22j Nielson, supra note 8. 
12. Trompeter v. Trompeter, 218 Kan. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1976). See infra note 31 
and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. CODE § 4601 (West 1970) and HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571-46 
(Supp. 1981) which provide the noncustodial parent with "reasonable visitation righte." 
See also Rabbino, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the DelJelopment of Judiciol Stan-
dtJrds, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 105. 110 (1979). That this "right of visitation" is solely a 
"right" and not a "responsibility" was made clear in Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 
565, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1982). The Louden court 
held that a child could not compel her non-custodial father to visit her. Some experte 
have' questioned visitation law that provides for the right to visit without 8 reciprocal 
responsibility to visit. See Benedeck & Benedeck, Post-DilJorce Visitation: A Child's 
Right, 16 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. J. 256 (1977); Bruch, supra note 11, at 24. 
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form of court-ordered child support payments.·t Traditionally, 
the actual day-to-day care of the child satisfied the mother's re-
sponsibility to the child, with fathers alone held legally responsi-
ble for their financial support. However, most states now hold 
both parents equally responsible for the financial support of the 
child, 111 without ascribing value to the custodial parent's non-
monetary contributions. 
The rights and responsibilities of parents under a joint cus-
tody order are not clearly delineated, as are those under sole 
custody. The term "joint custody" has been used to describe 
everything from "joint legal custody" to "joint physical," 
"shared," "dual," "divided," "alternating" and "split" custody.·e 
A. LEGAL AND PHYSICAL JOINT CUSTODY 
Although terminology varies, there are basic attributes com-
monly ascribed to "joint custody." Generally, joint custody is 
broken down into "legal" and "physical" custody. Joint "legal" 
custody· connotes parents' equal legal rights, or authority, to 
make the vital decisions afi'ecting the child's life.17 Joint "physi-
cal" custody indicates parents' alternating "physical care and 
living time with the child,"11 that is, equal responsibilities. 
Since joint custody legislation usually does not distinguish 
between "joint legal" and "joint physical" custody, one would 
assume that the term "joint custody" implies equal responsibil-
14. But see CHILD SUPPORT-WHDlI Is IT?, 7 SIWICH, A RaPoRT rOR TID URBAN 
INSTITUTE (1977) which reports that more than two·fifths of the divorced, l!eparated and 
single women entitled to receive child support have never received any payments. Inter· 
estingly, "fathers' rights" groups have publicly acknowledged the withholding of support 
as an appropriate reaction to an "improper visitation lIChedule." Ruaaell, Father, Haue 
Feelings, Rochester Time·Union, June 15, 1978, reprinted in Equal Rights for Fathers of 
New York State, Inc., Newsletter, Dec. 1978, at 3. 
15. "Today in the majority of states, statutes impoee the obliptioD of child support 
on both parents, rather than considering It to be the primary obliption of the father." 
Freed & Foster, supra note I, at 4054. 
16. Bruch, supra Dote 11; Ramey, Stender" Smaller, Joint Cwtody: Are Two 
Homes Better Than Onef, 8 GoLDBN GATS UNIV. L. RBv. 659, 560 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Ramey); Woolley, Shared Cwtody, 1 FAM. ADv., Summer 1978, at 6; Annot., 92 
A.L.R.2d §§ 1·14 (1950). 
17. Fain, Custody of Children, 1 CAL. FAM. LAWYBR 539. 564 (1962) (Continuing Ed· 
ucation of the Bar). 
18. Levy & Chambers, The Folly of Joint Cwtody. 3 FAM. ADv., Spring 1981. at 6, 
9. 
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ity for the day-to-day care of the children. In fact, most joint 
cUstody court orders and legislation expressly provide the oppo-
site.1t Legislation in Massachusetts, for example, provided for a 
presumption "that legal custody . . . shall remain equally with 
and be equally shared by both parents . . . independent of the 
residential and the shared living arrangements of the minor chil-
dren:"·o Joint custody "presumption" legislation in Pennsylva-
nia stated that "while actual [joint] physical custody may not be 
practical or appropriate in all cases, it is intended that both par-
ents have an opportunity to guide and nurture their children, 
and to meet the child's needs on an equal footing, beyond the 
considerations of support or actual physical custody. ,,.1 
The equal sharing of responsibility by parents fares no bet-
ter when joint custody is by court order. While "fathers' rights" 
groups and other joint custody proponents tout the succeBB of 
the California joint custody "experience,'''· Judge Billy Mills of 
the Los Angeles Superior Court points out that "[t]he bulk of 
these [joint custody] awards-perhaps 95 percent-specify joint 
legal custody rather than joint physical custody.'''· 
Many supporters of the joint custody concept only define it 
as joint legal custody; joint physical custody is not even envi-
sioned as part of the concept: "Some judges and attorneys are 
supportive of the concept of joint custody. On closer examina-
tion, however, they are still operating under the assumption that 
there would be a primary home and a primary parent, with lib-
eral visitation rights for the other parent. This is not joint 
custody."N 
Joint legal custody is particularly common when courts 
19. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4·9.1(c) (Supp. 1981). 
20. H. 1877, S. 2077, 1982 Reg. Seas. (Mass. 1982) (emphasis added). See Appendix 
B. 
21. S. 141, 166th Reg. Seas. (Pa. 1982), (emphasis added). See Appendix B. 
22. See Cook, Joint Custody, Sole Custody: A New Statute Reflects A New Per· 
spective, 18 COUNCIL. CTS. RBv., June 1980, at 31, 33·34; Cook, California Retires a 
Formula for Injustice in Child Custody Fights, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, pt. v. at 3, col. 
I, reprinted in Equal Rights for Fathers of New York State, Inc., Newsletter, March 
1980, at 12. 
23. Dullea, Weighing the Importance of a Joint Custody lAw, N.Y. Times, April 27, 
1981, at C·19, col. 2. 
24. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 10. 
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want to avoid labelling the noncustodial parent unfit.1I While 
this may be "joint custody in name only,"le the legal rights and 
responsibilities of the parents are affected. Further, confusion 
surrounding terminology and parents' rights works to the detri-
ment of the child. Children suffer as they become pawns in the 
hands of parents vying for control over the child. I? As Levy and 
Chambers point out, "ultimately, when the first crisis arises, the 
duplicity of terminology will result in exactly what the courts do 
not want-a return by the parents for enforcement, interpreta-
tion or reversal as a post-decree or appellate matter.''S8 
Unfortunately, court resolution of terminology has not been 
forthcoming. Despite the apparent decision-making authority 
vested in legal custodians, a California court held that an award 
of joint custody to both parents with physical custody in the 
mother· constituted an abuse of discretion, since these terms 
overlapped and became "ephemeral and essentially meaning-
less."11 The court found that remand for redetermination of 
"joint custody" was unnecessary since the "physical custody" 
award in fact gave the mother "custody."" Thus, the effect of 
the trial court's award was to vest all legal custodial rights in the 
physical custodian. On the other hand, in acknowledging the sig-
nificance of a legal custody award, courts have also found physi-
cal custody not to be determinative. In Trompeter v. 
Trompeter,ll the court concluded that the legal custodian (the 
father) exerted adequate decision-making authority over the 
child to constitute "custody," despite actual physical custody in 
a non-related third party. 
B. FREQUENTLY USED JOINT CUSTODY TERMS 
Once beyond the "legal" and "physical" qualifications of 
joint custody, ambiguity and confusion again abound. "Alternat-
ing,"'1 "shared,"" and "dual,"" custody are only a few of the 
25. Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641. 645. 403 N.Y.S.2d 401. 406 (197S); Levy & 
Chambers. supra note 18. at 8-9. 
26. Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641. 645. 403 N.Y.S.2d 401. 406 (1978). 
27. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18. at 10. 
28.Id. 
29. Neal v. Neal. 92 Cal. App. 3d 834. 841, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157. 163 (1979). 
30.Id. 
31. 218 Ken. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1976). 
32. Bratt, Joint Custody. 67 Ky. L.J. 271. 282 (1978-1979). 
Women's Law Forum 
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terms used interchangeably with "joint" custody. "Divided" cus-
tody often signifies the alternating of sole custody between the 
parents, where each parent has physical and legal custody of the 
child for a designated time period.811 Some of the most common 
arrangements are a nine and three month division based on the 
school calendar, or a six month division." 
The term "divided" custody has also been applied to a 
"split" custody arrangement." However, a "split" arrangement 
generally means that siblings are divided up between the par-
ents and each parent maintains sole custody of the child or chil-
dren awarded to him or her." Once the "split" has been made, 
the principles of sole custody govern. 
Although some authorities claim that the di1ferences in ter-
minology are basically semantic, a, these variances produce con-
fusion and obscure the legal rights and responsibilities of par-
ents, to the possible detriment of the child. 
II. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF JOINT CUSTODY 
LEGISLATION 
A. TYPES OF JOINT CUSTODY LEGISLATION 
As of March 1982, 24 states have joint custody statutes.40 
Over the past two years, joint custody legislation has been intro-
duced in almost every other jurisdiction,41 and amendments to 
strengthen existing joint custody statutes have been introduced 
in California, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
33. Woolley, supra note 16. 
34. Bruch, supra note 11. 
35. Cox & Cease, Joint Custody: What Does It MeanY How Does It WorkF 1, FAIl. 
Aov., Summer 1978, at 10, 11. 
36.Id. 
37.Id. 
38. A. LINDNEY, SEPAl\ATlON AGREEMENTS AND ANTB-NUP'I'W. CoNTRACI'S 14-60 (rev. 
ed.1977). 
39. Ramey, supra note 16. But see Legislative Reform, supra note 5, at 23-24 ("The 
terms 'joint' or 'shared' custody have taken on different meanings from state to state and 
even in the courts of the same state."). 
40. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wis-
consin. See Joint Custody Statlttes, Appendix A for citations. 
41. See Joint Custody Legislation. Appendix B for a list of states and full citations. 
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Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas." This spate of 
joint custody legislation in less than three years is surprising 
when compared with the fact that it has taken more than twenty 
years for thirty-seven states to move from the "tender years" (or 
"maternal presumption") doctrine to a gender-neutral "best in-
terests of the child" doctrine. fa 
Most of the current joint custody legislation does not ap-
pear problematic at first glance. Proponents usually claim that 
the legislation merely provides the court with the option of 
awarding joint custody!· However, an examination of the enu-
merated and implied provisions, and the impact of these provi-
sions on custody disputes, reveals that most of the legislation is 
at best unnecessary, and at worst inimical to the best interests 
of children and the parent charged with the day-to-day responsi-
bilities of childraising. 
There are four types of joint custody bills: (1) joint custody 
as an option; (2) joint custody as an option only when parties are 
in agreement; (3) joint custody upon the request of one party; 
(4) joint custody "preference" and "presumption." 
1. Joint Custody as an Option 
The simplest form of joint custody statute provides that 
"the order may include provision for joint custody of the chil-
dren by the parties."" Under this type of statute, the court is 
42. See Appendices A & B for citations. 
43. E.,., While the "best interests" standard first appeared in California's custody 
statute in 1931 (1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 930, § I), it was not until 1972 that all presumptions 
were deleted and the "best interests" standard was stated in gender-neutral terms. See 
CAL. Cw. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982). As of September 1980, all but four states had 
incorporated the "best interests" standard into their custody laws. 6 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 
4057 (1980). 
44. See, e.,., Dullea, Wei,hi", the Impact of a Joint Cwtody Law, N.Y. Times, 
April 27, 1981, at C-19, col. 2, interpreting the New York joint custody bill as simply 
providing courts with the" right to award joint custody if both parents agree." However, 
the bill in fact included a joint custody presumption, court authorization to malte awards 
on either party's request, and consideration of "frequent and continuing contact" with 
the noncustodial parent 88 a primary factor in a sole custody determination. In rebuttal, 
see Cohen, Mischiellous Bill on Joint Custody, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, at A-14, col. 5 
(Letters to the Editor). 
45. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (1981) (emphasis added). States with "option" statutes 
are Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, MinnelOta, Montana, North Caro-
lina, Oregon and Pennsylvania. See Appendix A, col. A.1 for citations. 
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expressly granted the power or authority to award joint custody. 
Although a few statutes do not include reference to the "best 
interests" standard, most provide for joint custody as an option 
"if it appears to the court that joint custody would be in the 
best interests of the chUd . . . .".8 
The major drawback of the "option" statute is its failure to 
set adequate limits or standards on the court's' power to order 
joint custody. It permits the court to opt for joint custody as an 
easy out, as a means of "escap[ing] an agonizing choice, to keep 
from wounding the self-esteem of either parent. . . to avoid the 
appearance of discrimination between the sexes."47 
Under this type of statute, it is possible for a court to force 
joint custody on parties who are not in agreement or who have 
not considered the consequences of a joint custody award and 
arrangement.·· As most experts agree, opposition by one parent 
to joint custody is antithetical to the concept itself, if not to the 
best interests of the child." Joint custody forced upon two hos-
tile parents can create a dangerous environment for a child, such 
as conflicting directives to physicians with respect to medical 
care, or to educational institutions regarding education.1IO The 
child's immediate needs will be prevented from having prompt 
resolution while emergency decisions await court resolution of 
the dispute between the joint custodians. 
The "option" statute may create more problems than it 
solves. The lack of directives or guidelines to the court increases 
the likelihood that joint custody will be ordered in inappropriate 
cases. 
46. NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.140(1) (1981). See also Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana 
and North Carolina statutes. (citations in Appendix A). 
47. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (1978). 
48. See Adler v. Adler, 51 A.D.2d 694, 379 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1976) (ordering joint cus-
tody although neither party sought it). As two commentaton note, "legal edicts cannot 
force parents to agree on child rearing questions." Levy & Chamben, supra note 18, at 8. 
49. "Joint custody ... cannot succeed ... when imposed upon parents who are 
irrevocably opposed to it and who refuse to give the cooperation joint custody requires." 
Legislative Reform. supra note 5, at 24; see also Miller. Joint Custody. 13 FAM. L.Q. 345. 
369 (1979). 
50. See. e.g .• Levy & Chamben. supra note 18. at 8. 
9
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2. Joint Custody as an Option Only when Parties Are In 
Agreement 
A few states permit a court to order joint custody only when 
the parties are in agreement. III The Texas statute expressly al-
lows parties to enter into a written agreement providing for joint 
custody. III The court still retains ultimate authority since it must 
approve the parties' agreement and find that it is in the best 
interests of the child. However, because parents can agree to 
joint custody and make such an arrangement for the child with-
out a court order, the court's role as final arbiter becomes mean-
ingless; these parents will have joint custody regardless of a 
court order. "Many share equal rights and responsibilities in de-
cision-making and care-taking of their offspring, even though le-
gal custody has been granted to one or the other parent. In these 
instances, the parents have made an emotional and moral com-
mitment to their children . . . . "118 
Although New York does not have a joint custody statute, 
case law permits joint custody awards only when the parties are 
in agreement.1I4 In Braiman v. Braiman, III the New York Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's forced joint custody order. 
The court noted that, despite a four-year separation, the parties 
remained unable to contain their "ill-feelings, hatred and disre-
spect" for each other and had been unable to work out even a 
limited visitation schedule. lit Ordering a new hearing, the court 
held that joint custody is "insupportable when parents are se-
verely antagonistic and embattled."II., 
This "option only when parties agree" statute is the best of 
the joint custody legislation. It comports with the findings of 
51. KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 6O·1610(b) (1976)j LA. Crv. CODa ANN. art. 146·147 (West 
Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 299, § 31 (1981)j OHIO REv. CODa ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 
1980); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982)j WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
247.24(1)(b) (1981). Connecticut's newly amended statute only permits awards of "joint 
legal custody without awarding joint physical custody where the parents have agreed 
merely to joint legal custody." 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-407, I 2(b) (to be codified at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 466-56 (Supp. 1982 & 1982 app. IIUpp.). 
52. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). 
53. Levy and Chambers, supra note 18, at 9. See aiso, Arbarbanel, supra note 9. 
54. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584,378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d «9 (1978). 
55. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). 
56. [d. at 590, 378 N.E.2d at 1026, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451. 
57. [d. at 587, 378 N.E.2d at 1023, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 449. 
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most experts that these are the only appropriate cases for joint 
custody. 
However, problems can arise even under this type of legisla-
tion. A parent who does not believe joint custody is in the child's 
best interests may be forced into accepting such an "agreement" 
out of fear that she or he will stand at a disadvantage and lose 
sole custody in a contested trial. This is particularly a problem 
when the custody statute requires that the court consider, as a 
factor in determining sole custody, which parent would provide 
greater access of the child to the other parent.at The parent 
seeking joint custody appears "friendlier" and would therefore 
receive preference in the sole custody award. I. 
To date, these statutes and legislation do not require courts 
to make an inquest into whether the parental joint custody 
agreement was made knowingly and voluntarily. Because of the 
potential for court approval of agreements made under duress or 
coercion, some bar associations have actively opposed this type 
of legislation: 
Moreover, the bill would give a preference to joint 
custody if the parties so agree, but it does not 
provide a· mandatory inquest into whether the 
agreement was knowing and voluntary. It· is 
widely reported among the defense bar that hus-
bands are applying, or threatening to apply, for 
joint or sole· custody in order to bargain for a re-
duction in alimony and/or child support. This 
bill's preference without mandatory inquest 
would encourage the use of joint custody applica-
tions purely as a tactical weapon." 
Another family lawyer noted: "[T]his bill does not provide a 
mandatory inquest into any agreement wherein the parties had 
agreed to preference of joint custody and thus, many wives 
might be forced into giving up sole custody as a result of coer-
68. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
223(2) (1981). See Appendices A & B, col. B-1. 
59. For a discussion of this "catch-22," see "Friendly Parent Provisions," infra notes 
75-92 and accompanying text. 
60. COMMITJ'EE ON THE FAMILY COURT, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' Asg'N, REPORT 
No. 81-A (June 1981) (submitted in opposition to and recommending disapproval of, S. 
3255A, A. 4166A, 204th Legis. 1981 Seas. (New York) (available at 14 Vesey St., New 
York, N.Y. 10007). 
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cion and/or duress, without the court having knowledge of the 
same."61 
3. Joint Custody Upon Request of One Party 
This type of statute allows the court to award joint custody 
"on either parent's application" or request.61 Most authorities 
agree that joint custody is only appropriate and in a child's best 
interests when both parents agree to such a plan and are capable 
of joint decision-making regarding the child's welfare.61 This 
type of joint custody legislation is antithetical to the above crite-
ria since the court can force joint custody on those parents who 
are not in agreement or who have not shown themselves capable 
of co-parenting. Legal edicts cannot force parents to agree on 
childrearing questions. Nor can the fate of children rest on the 
possibility of success: 
Legal orders cannot be predicated on good 
intentions, but must take into account existing 
facts and behaviors. A joint custody award should 
not rest on the ultimate hope that successful co-
parenting may result. When all available evidence 
indicates that the parents cannot agree that the 
sun will come up in the morning, much less on the 
handling of their children, a joint custody order 
will not change anything. If 
This type of statute is extremely dangerous when it is cou-
pled with a "friendly parent" provision.611 The parent requesting 
joint custody over the opposition of the other parent is given an 
unconscionable bargaining lever. A parent who does not believe 
61. Letter from Lester Wallman, Chair of Committee on Legislation, New York 
Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, to Robert L. Schack, Esq. 
(May 28, 1981) (regarding New York S. 325M, A. 4166A) (on file at National Center on 
Women and Family Law, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, N.Y., 10003). 
62. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982); HAWAU REv. STAT. §§ 
571.46·.46.1 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23(5)(a) (Supp. 1982); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 40-4-224 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (Supp. 1981); 1981 Pa. 
Laws, No. 115 (to be codified at PA. CoN. STAT. ANN. § 23.1001-.10015). See also legisla-
tion introduced in New York and South Carolina, Appendix B, col. A.3. 
63. Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-making Alternative, 
WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, March 1978, at 10, 12-13; O'Neil & Leanoff, Joint Custody: An 
Option Worth Examining, PERCEPTION, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 28. 
64. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8. 
65. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text. See auo statutes cited, Appendix 
A, col. B-l. 
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joint custody would be in her or his child's best interests is put 
mto a negotiating position of either "accepting" joint custody or 
risking the 1088 of custody altogether in a contested trial. 
Ironically, a parent who is least fit for the custody and care 
of a child benefits the most from this type of statute. A parent 
opposed to joint custody might be more willing to risk loss of 
sole custody if she or he feels that the other parent is capable of 
providing sufficient care for the child. However, the parent op-
posed to joint custody cannot, and probably will not, take that 
risk when an award of custody to the other parent would not 
provide minimally sufficient care for the child. Thus, the more 
"unfit" the parent requesting joint custody, the more bargaining 
leverage that parent gains under this type of statute. 
4. Joint Custody Preference/Presumption 
Joint custody "preference" statutes" prioritize available 
custody resolutions and mandate that joint custody must be 
given first consideration by the courts. Under a presumption 
statute,'" joint custody is presumed by law to be in the best in-
terests of the child. Thus, sole custody can be ordered only when 
the "presumption" is rebutted by evidence proving that joint 
custody is detrimental to the child's best interests. Many of 
these bills declare joint custody to be the norm, and that it is to 
be encouraged as an express public policy of the state." 
66. See, e.g., Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, and 
New Mexico statutes (citations at Appendix A). While CAL. CIV. CODS § 4600 (West 
Supp. 1982) appears on its face to give equal weight to joint custody and sole custody 
("to both parents jointly or to either parent"), it has been interpreted and touted as a 
joint custody "preference." See Cook, Joint Cwtody, Sole Cwtody: A New Statute Re-
/iects a New Perspediue, 18 CONClL. Ora. REv., JUDe 1980, at 32. 
67. California was the first state to incorporate a joint custody presumption. See 
CAL. CIV. CODS § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982). See also 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 81-402; 
FLA. STAT. § 61.l3(2)(b) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODS ANN. § 32-717B (Supp. 1982); 
MICH. Co ..... LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a)(2) (Supp. 1981); NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.240 (1981); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 458.16 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4-9.1(A) (Supp. 1981). 
"Presumption" legialation has been introduced in Alaska, Illinois, KanB88, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina 
and the District of Columbia. See Appendix B for citations. 
68. E.g., CAL. CIV. CoDS § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982) states that it is the state's 
public policy to 8B8ure "frequent and continuing contact with both parents ... to en-
courage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing." See also S. 
3255B, A. 4155B, 204th Legis., 1981 Seas. (New York, introduced Feb. 23, 1981) (vetoed 
by the Governor). 
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While the degree of weight accorded joint custody differs 
under "presumption" and "preference" statutes, the effect of 
these statutes is basically the same: Joint custody becomes the 
norm and is assumed to be appropriate for all or most cases. 
Sole custody is relegated to an exception that is appropriate and 
to be considered only after the court has decided against joint 
custody. 
To date, most express joint custody presumptions are lim-
ited to those cases where parents have agreed to joint custody.·· 
However, these statutes also include provisions that (1) permit 
joint custody upon the request of one party and (2) give prefer-
ence in sole custody to that party requesting joint custody.fO The 
practical and combined effect of these two additional provisions 
is an implied joint custody presumption in all cases. Should a 
parent opposed to joint custody "agree" out of fear of losing cus-
tody altogether at trial, this "agreement" then becomes entitled 
to the express presumption. 
[A] parent involved in a custody dispute might 
pressure the other parent to agree to an award of 
joint custody, not because it is in the child's best 
interests, but rather to avoid a contest for custody 
. . . . In such a case, the presumption of joint 
custody when parents agree might be an undesir-
able obstacle to the court's determination of what 
is truly in the child's best interests.71 
Joint custody presumptions, express and implied, contradict 
and abrogate the "best interests of the child" standard. The ba-
sis of the "best interests" standard is a case-by-case determina-
tion where the court's decision is based on the facts of the par-
ticular case rather than an assumption or "presumption" of 
what is in the best interests of all children.f• 
69. See statutes cited supra note 67. 
70. See "Friendly Parent Provisions," infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text. 
71. STANDING Co MM. REp. No. 706.8, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 1979-1980 Seas. (Ha-
waii) (March 10, 1980) (statement of Hon. Betty M. Vitousek, Senior Judge, Hawaii 
Family Court) (opposing the portion of S. 2419 which would create a joint custody pre-
sumption when both parents agree). 
72. "In the end, as in every child custody decision, it is the welfare of the children 
which governs and each case will tum on its individual facts and circumstances." Dodd 
v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (1978). 
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The use of "best interests" language in "presumption" stat-
utes is a play on words which avoids confronting the fact that 
the "best interests" teRt has iii fact been supplanted. As most 
experts agree, "ideally there should be no presumption for or 
against joint custody, and each case should be decided on the 
basis of its . . . facts.'''' 
The assumption that joint custody is appropriate or worka-
ble in all or most cases is unrealistic. Joint custody, at a mini-
mum, requires that parents are able to communicate and willing 
to put aside their personal differences. This cannot be assumed 
of most parties who are in the middle or aftermath of divorce.'· 
B. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODy-RELATED 
Most joint custody legislation does not simply grant courts 
the authority or power to award joint custody. Instead, the legis-
lation usually contains various additional provisions, both re-
lated and unrelated to the joint custody issue. Those provisions 
that are directly related to joint custody serve to increase the 
pressure on courts to award joint custody. Four of these provi-
sions, that were identified by a survey of all joint custody legisla-
tion, will be discussed: "friendly parent" provisions, provisions 
setting higher evidentiary standards in custody proceedings, re-
quirements that courts must state in writing their reasons for 
denying joint custody, and "modification at any time" 
provisions. 
Many provisions included in joint custody legislation have 
little or nothing to do with the joint custody issue. These provi-
sions, to a large extent, serve to confuse the pertinent joint cus-
tody provisions at issue. In addition, these "unrelated" provi-
sions seem to promote erosion of the custodial parent's rights 
vis-a-vis the rights of the noncustodial parent. Consequently, 
four "unrelated" provisions will also be discussed: accountings 
by the custodial parent, "no removal of child from family home" 
provisions, "access to records" provisions, and "minimum visita-
tion" requirements. 
73. Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at '1:1. 
74. "The experience of most lawyers is that the typical client is embittered during 
and after divorce and is not prepared to accept the continuing contact with the other 
parent that joint custody requires." Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at 27. 
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1. "Friendly Parent''7G Provisions 
Some joint custody statutes and much of the recent legisla-
tion includes a "friendly parent" provision.?8 This provision di-
rects the courts to consider which parent would be more likely to 
allow "frequent and continuing contact" with the other parent 
in determining who should be awarded sole custody as an alter-
native to joint custody.?? Some statutes and bills include an ex-
press legislative declaration or finding that "the public policy of 
the state is to assure minor children of frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents" after separation or divorce.T8 
While the concept expressed by the "friendly parent" provi-
sion may be important and long-overdue, the practical effect of 
the provision is to promote the use of the custody issue-and 
thus, the children-as bargaining tools in divorce. This was, ac-
cording to James Cook, who drafted the California joint custody 
statute, the purpose of the "friendly parent" provision: "It's a 
new twist on an old game called keepaway .... We've tried to 
put a new handicap on the game by requiring the court to favor 
the most cooperative parent.''''· 
When only one parent seeks joint custody, the court, pursu-
ant to the "friendly parent" provision, may favor or give prefer-
ence to that parent in a sole custody award. The potential for 
abuse is clear: "Joint custody will become an issue for barter, a 
bargaining lever to be used to compel financial and other capitu-
lation by the parent who believes that the child's best interests 
will be served by stability and continuity and not by shuttling 
back and forth. "80 The provision encourages and promotes bad 
faith requests for joint custody, made solely for the purpose of 
bartering on other issues. 
75. This is the author's term. 
76. See statutes in California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire and Pennsylvania (citations in Appendix A); and legislation in Alaska, Dis· 
trict of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, and South Caro-
lina (citations in Appendix B). 
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982); see also MONT. CODB ANN. § 40·4· 
223(2) (1981); and legislation in New Jeney, New York, and South Carolina (citations in 
Appendix B). 
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982); see also, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40·4· 
223(2) (1981). See generally Appendix B, col. B·l. 
79. Dullea, supra note 44. 
SO. Cohen, supra note 44. See also Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8·9. 
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Parents who believe joint custody is not in their child's best 
interests will either "agree" to joint custody or "bargain." Few 
will risk going into court against a parent seeking joint custody. 
Children suffer either way-by an unworkable joint custody ar-
rangement or by the custodial parent's "bartering away" of 
financial resources necessary for the child's support. 
Finally, the court's power to determine custody based on 
the child's "best interests" is circumvented. Instead, the court 
will be faced with a fait accompli: a joint custody "agreement" 
that it must acceptS1 or a property settlement agreement that 
does not adequately provide for the child's financial well-being.1I 
Battered women's advocates have strongly opposed 
"friendly parent" provisions because of the dangers they present 
to clients and their children. The impact of this provision on 
battered women cannbt be discounted when one realizes how se-
rious and widespread wife abuse is in our society: "[H]alf of all 
wives will experience some form of spouse-inflicted violence dur-
ing their marriage, regardless of race or socioeconomic status. "Ia 
Advocates point out that "[T]he presumption that continu-
ing contact with the [abusive] father is in the best interests of 
the child . . . is to discount the harmful effects such a role 
model may have on both the individual and on the perpetuation 
of violence in our system."84 
The "friendly parent" provision also guarantees the batterer 
continuing contact with his victim. As advocates point out, di-
vorce and separation do not end battering. Studies reveal that 
violence often increases when the abusive spouse realizes he is 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 66·74. 
82. Courts are generally bound by the parties' written property settlement agree-
ments. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48OO(a) (West Supp. 1982). 
83. REPORT OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE UNITED STATES CONFERBNCE OF 
MAYORS, cited in LANGLEY & LEVY, WIFE BBATING - THE SILENT CRlSBS 4 (1977). See 
generally, MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 10-22 (1976); Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Bat-
tered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 8, 11-13 (1978). 
84. Hearings on A. 1471, Comm. on the Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense, 
1980 Sess. (New Jersey, 1980) (testimony of Diane Palladino, Director, Women Helping 
Women, Abused Women's Services, Middlesex County, N.J.) (July 24,1980) [hereinafter 
cited as N.J. Hearings}. The testimony is available from the National Center on Women 
and Family Law, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York. N.Y. 10003. 
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losing control over his victim." Thus, "[ w ]omen in this situation 
may not be cooperative in 'assuring frequent and continuing 
contact' . . . . [T]he abusive parent may use this [provision] to 
provide the court with evidence as to why he or she should be 
granted sole custody, thus placing the children in the care of an 
abusive parent."" 
Absent child or wife abuse, legal and mental health profes-
sionals are beginning to recognize that children need meaningful 
and continuing relationships with both parents after divorce or 
separation." "Friendly parent" provisions may reflect these con-
cerns. While fathers' rights groups insist that this need can only 
be fulfilled by a joint custody order," legal and mental health 
professionals point out that "meaningful association with both 
parents is common under the traditional sole custody-subject to 
visitation formula"" where courts award substantial visitation 
rights to the noncustodial parent." Parents who are committed 
to sharing the raising of their children and are emotionally able 
to co-parent, do not require a joint custody order to do so. In 
fact, in two studies of children in joint custody arrangements,·1 
none of the families studied had or were operating under joint 
custody court orders; all orders were for sole custody-visitation. 
As two legal experts have noted: "In a sense, therefore, some of 
the agitation for joint custody really involves status-seeking 88 
legal custodian (or co-custodian); or 'one-upmanship' . u .. 
2. Evidentiary Standards 
Custody determinations in most states are based upon a 
85. UNIV. or NEW HAMPSHIRK, FAMILY VIOLltNC& RilsBARcH PROORAM, FORCBD Sa 1M 
MARRIAGE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1980) (D. Finkelor & K. YUo). 
86. N.J. Hearings, supra note 84 (testimony of EUen Koteen, Vice President, New 
Jersey Coalition for Battered Women). 
87. Viable Alternative, supra note I, at 24. But .ee, GoLD8TB1H, FREUD & SoLNlT, 
BEYOND THE BEST INTBRBSTS or THE CHILD (1973). 
88. A Voice for Divorced Fathers, Equal Rightl for Fathers of New York State,Inc., 
Newsletter, May-June, 1980. 
89. Viable Alternative, supra note 1, at 27. 
90. This is, in fact, what some supporters of the joint cuatody concept envision as a 
joint custody arrangement! See supra note 24 and accompanyilll test. 
91. Arbarbanel, Shared Parenti,., After Separation or Diuorce: A Study of Joinl 
Custody, 49(2) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 320 (1979); Steinman, The Ezperience of Children in 
a Joint Custody Arrangement: A Report of Q Study, 51(3) AM. J. OItTHOPSYCH. 403 
(1981). 
92. Viable Alternative, supra note I, at 31. 
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"best interests" standard.lla The court does not have to go to the 
extreme of finding one parent unfit in order to award custody to 
the other parent. This standard permits the parents and court to 
concentrate on the child's needs rather than the parents' 
faults.H 
However, some joint custody legislation includes provisions 
that mandate standards of proof beyond "best interests."" A 
party 'opposing joint custody, under this legislation, must meet 
the higher standard of proof in order to prevail. That joint cus-
tody may simply not be the best arrangement for the child is 
insufficient to avoid the joint custody order. 
Presumption and preference statutes are the typical exam-
ple of these new and higher proof standards. However, legisla-
tion in Michigan and Massachusetts contemplated even heavier 
proof standards to ayoid a joint custody order. The recently en-
acted Michigan statute" provides for mandatory joint custody 
when the parents have agreed to this arrangement. The court 
can only avoid a joint custody order if "clear and convincing evi-
dence" establishes that joint custody is not in the child's best 
93. "A divorce court . . . should . . . take into consideration all 
the circumstances of each particular case and dispose of the 
children in such manner as may appear best calculated to se-
cure for the,n proper care and attention as well as education. 
In other words, the welfare of the child[ren) is the chief 
consideration. 
Annot., 24 AM. JUR. 2D 783 (1966). Many states, by statute, delineate the factors to be 
considered under the "best interest" standard. E.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6) 
(Supp. 1981). 
94. Court opinions make it clear that interests of the child is a 
separate issue from parental fitness. An award of custody to 
one parent does not legally imply that the other is unfit. Both 
attorneys and psychotherapists need to help parents under-
stand that custodial awards are for the benefit of the child and 
not the parents, and that no stigma attaches to being noncus-
todial. The order is rather a demonstration of concern of the 
needs of the children. 
Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
95. E.g., CAL. CIY. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982) (presumption); MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. § 722.23(6a) (Supp. 1981) (presumption and "clear and convincing evi-
dence"). See also legislation in Massachusetts (H. 2631, S. 6172 (gross unfitness); H. 420, 
S. 2059 ("unfit parent"); H. 1877, S. 2077 (presumption»; New Jersey (A. 407 (groea 
unfitness of parent»; New York (A. 2385 (presumption»; Oregon (H. 2538 (presump-
tion»; South Carolina (H. 3248 (presumption». For citations, see Appendices A and B, 
col. B-l. 
96. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6) (Supp. 1981). 
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interests. The use of "best interests" language is misleading. 
Proof that a sole custody order would be the best or even a bet-
ter arrangement for the child may be inadequate to overcome 
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The difficulty of 
overcoming this standard of proof was illustrated in In re 
Abdullah97 where an Illinois appellate court found that a man's 
conviction for murdering his wife (the child's mother) was not 
"clear and convincing evidence" of depravity or unfitness so as 
to deny him custody of his child.87.1 
In Massachusetts, three joint custody bills were introduced 
in the 1980 session, each ennunciating a different burden of 
proof. H. 2631/8. 6172 mandated joint custody where both par-
ties consented unless there was proof that one parent was "so 
grossly unfit as to cause danger to the child." H. 420/8. 2059 
provided for mandatory joint custody (regardless of parties' 
agreement) unless the party opposing the arrangement could 
show the other parent to be "unfit." S. 1962, sponsored by the 
Boston Bar Association, proposed that joint custody be ordered 
so long as there was no finding or showing that the order went 
against the child's best interests. The heavy burden of proving 
"gross unfitness," or even the lesser "unfitness," places the par-
ent opposing joint custody at a severe disadvantage in the court-
room. Courts are reluctant to label a parent unfit, especially 
since most cases involve disputes between two legally "fit" 
parents.98 
Most of these heavier proof standards have been restricted 
(at least until now) to those cases where parents have agreed to 
joint custody. The underlying purpose of these provisions is 
probably to restrict courts from interfering with parents' wishes. 
However, there are no express provisions included in these bills 
which allow-or force-courts to examine agreements to see if 
one of the parties agreed under duress or fear of losing cus-
97. 80 Ill. App. 3d 1144,400 N.E.2d 1063 (1980), rev'd 85 Ill. 2d 300, 423 N.E.2d 915 
(1981). 
97.1 Ed. note: In re Abdullah was reversed on appeal, the Dlinois Supreme Court 
finding that the husband's conviction for murder was ample evidence of depravity, and 
that placing the child in his custody was against the child's best interest. 85 Ill. 2d 300, 
423 N.E.2d 915 (1981). 
98. Bratt, supra note 32; Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal 
Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 127 (1978). 
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tody.99 The likelihood that such duress or coercion will occur in-
creases where the statute includes a "friendly parent" 
provision.loo 
Additionally, it is unclear what factors will permit the court 
to disregard parents' joint custody agreements. What weight will 
the child's wishes have?IOI What weight will be given to psychi-
atric, probation, medical or school reports that disapprove of the 
joint custody arrangement? Under most of these higher proof 
standards, such factors may not be sufficient to upset the joint 
custody agreement. 
Finally, these higher proof standards may foretell a trend 
away from the "best interests" doctrine and case-by-case deter-
mination in custody disputes. The high degree of weight courts 
are forced to give parental agreements under this type of legisla-
tion constitutes a radical change in custody law. Heretofore, pa-
rental contracts regarding their children have been unenforce-
able per se, although, of course, subject to consideration by 
courts. Under these new and higher proof standards, parental 
contracts, regardless of the circumstances under which they are 
entered or their impact on the children involved, will be entitled 
to extraordinary weight and preference. The court's traditional 
position as parens patriae, lOll is, in effect, undermined. 
Some legal and mental health professionals and parents 
may view this trend as a positive step toward removing custody 
from the adversarial system. However, such a view fails to ac-
knowledge that "bargaining" over custody will remain, regard-
less of whether a court is involved. And, women and children, 
who do not yet have equal bargaining power with men in this 
society, will suffer. This was well-illustrated in a 1978 New York 
joint custody case lOS where the court pointed out: 
99. See supra notes 58·61 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
101. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981) (upholding a trial 
court's sua sponte forced joint custody order not requested by either parent and opposed 
by the children). 
102. The role of the court (or state) as parens patriae stems from early Englieh 
Common Law and is based on the state's paramount interest in protecting children 
within its jurisdiction and acting for their welfare. H. CLARK, LAw or DOMESTIC RBLA· 
TlONS §§ 17.1, 17·7 (1968). 
103. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1978). 
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Dr. Dodd has been uncompromising and Mrs. 
Dodd, while a participant in the frequent acrimo-
nious quarrels, has acquiesced to her husband's 
demands in large measure out of fear that her 
husband's threats to remove the children, to 
prove her an abusive mother and to withhold sup-
port, could be carried out with impunity . . . . 
In the Dodd family, the father has dominated the 
mother, has forced his views on her, threatened 
her and belittled her. 1M 
3. Mandatory Writing Required for Denial of Joint Custody 
Joint custody "presumption legislation"IOo usually includes 
the additional mandate that "[i]f the court declines to enter an 
order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subdivision, the 
court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an 
award of joint custody."I06 This provision further encourages 
courts to prefer joint custody over sole custody, and establishes 
a record for appeal which, in effect, limits the court's discretion 
in custody decisions. This provision underscores an assumption 
that joint custody is appropriate in all or most cases and there-
fore the court does not need to explain its decision when joint 
custody is ordered. 
Courts do not generally have to explain their reasons for 
custody decisions. All that is required, or stated in most cases, is 
that the court has found the custodial parent "fit" and that the 
particular award is in the child's best interests. 
Requiring courts to explain their reasons and the factors 
they considered in making all custody decisions has several ben-
efits. Custody law will become clearer and more uniform as "fac-
tors" become better articulated. When lawyers and parents are 
aware of the factors the court will consider, settlement is en-
couraged and extensive and frivolous litigation avoided. 
104. rd. at 647-48, 650, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 408, 501. 
105. See Joint Custody PreferencelPresumption, supra notes 66-74 and accompany-
~~ . 
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). See statutes 
in Connecticut, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire; and legislation in Alaska. 
District of Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and 
South Carolina (citations at Appendices A and B). But see MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. I 
722.23(6a) (Supp. 1981). 
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However, mandatory written explanation only when joint 
custody is denied, rather than in all custody decisions, merely 
pressures the court to opt for joint custody as the easy solution, 
rather than the best solution, to a difficult problem. Given the 
backlog of cases in court, judges may choose the easy way out: 
Joint custody avoids another written statement. Judges may opt 
for joint custody, even when they believe it is not in a child's 
best interest, in order to avoid further disruption to the child by 
continued litigation and appeals. While joint custody is an ap-
pealing concept, it should not, as Judge Shea in Dodd v. Dodd lo, 
pointed out, be used to escape an agonizing choice or decision. 
This writing requirement, by applying only when the court de-
nies joint custody, encourages "escape" rather than careful de-
liberation and decision. 
Finally, it would be more realistic to require courts to ex-
plain in writing why they order joint custody, rather than why 
they deny it.IOB Joint custody requires, at the very least, two par-
ents who are not hostile to each other and who are able to com-
municate and make joint decisions. Since it can hardly be as-
sumed that this describes most spouses at the time of divorce, it 
should not be assumed when children are involved. l09 
4. Modification "At Any Time" Provisions 
Several joint custody statuies and bills include a provision 
that "any order for the custody of the minor child or children 
. . . may . . . be modified at any time to an order of joint cus-
tody."uO As with most of the additional provisions contained in 
joint custody legislation, the "modification at any time" encour-
ages and promotes the joint custody resolution over that of sole 
custody. Specifically, parents with sole custody orders are en-
107. 93 Misc. 2d 641, 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1978). 
108. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a)(l) (Supp. 1981) (requiring the 
court to "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a request" of joint 
custody by either parent). 
109. "The belief that parents who are otherwise unwilling to cooperate will somehow 
be inspired to do 80 because of joint custody reflects magical thinking." Benedek & 
Benedek, Post-Divorce Visitation, A Child's Right, 16 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSVCH. J. 256, 
257 (1977). 
110. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571.45.l(d) (Supp. 1981); see also statutes in California. 
Connecticut, Nevada. New Hampshire. New Mexico. Pennsylvania, and legislation in 
District of Columbia, Maryland, Miesouri. New Jersey, New York and South Carolina 
(see Appendices A and B, Col. B-4, for citations). 
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couraged to return to court for a modification to joint custody. 
The provision constitutes a radical change in custody law be-
cause it abrogates the "change of circumstances" standard tradi-
tionally required for custody modification. 
The "change of circumstances" doctrine, with its attendant 
proof burdens, seeks to protect and promote the child's welfare 
by preserving the stable home environment created since the 
original decree. The doctrine seeks to minimize continued and 
frivolous custody litigation by requiring the party seeking modi-
fication to prove both that a change has occurred since the origi-
nal decree, and that the change renders the original arrangement 
and order no longer in the child's best interests. lII Thus, 
"changes" which do not operate to the detriment of the child do 
not theoretically constitute a "change in circumstances" suffi-
cient to justify a custody modification. Factors constituting a 
change in circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes 
in the custodial parent's mental and moral fitness,1II religious 
factors,113 the child's physical environment, IU the child's prefer-
ence,116 one party's residence (e.g., a move out of state),118 re-
marriage by one of the parties,117 and alienation of the child's 
affection from the noncustodian by the custodial parent.11I 
The unfettered power to challenge custody orders is in di-
rect conflict with the deference courts give to original custody 
decrees.118 By removing the burden of proving the existence of 
any "change" factors, the "modification at any time" provision 
Ill. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 530 P.2d 480 (Mont. S. Ct. 1975). 
112. Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal. 2d 118,338 P.2d 450 (1959); Ashwell v. Ashwell, 135 Cal. 
App. 3d 211, 286 P.2d 983 (1955). 
113. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 104 A.2d 898 (1954). 
114. Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal. App. 2d 404, 119 P.2d 736 (1940). But see, Anderson 
v. Wilcox, 163 Neb. 883, 81 N.W.2d 314 (1957). 
115. Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1954). But ,ee, Strickler v. Strickler, 
57 Ill. App. 2d 286, 206 N.E.2d 720 (1965). 
116. Duncan v. Duncan, 293 Ky. 762, 170 S.W.2d 22 (1943); Freed v. Freed, 309 
N.Y. 668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955). 
117. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953); McGuire v. McGuire, 
190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908 (1962). 
118. Rutstein v. Rutstein, 324 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Reynolds v. Reyn-
olds, 45 Wash. 2d 394, 275 P.2d 421 (1954). 
119. Bistany v. Bistany, 66 A.D.2d 1026, 411 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1978); Underwood v. 
Underwood, 38 Or. App. 213, 589 P.2d 1172 (1979); Doane v. Doane, 330 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
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enables the non custodian to subject both the custodian and 
child to endless and potentially frivolous litigation. 
Significantly, the "modification at any time" provision may 
only apply to modifications which seek joint custody.IIO Where 
joint custody is originally ordered and one parent seeks a modifi-
cation to sole custody, the traditional "change of circumstances" 
standard may still apply. It may therefore be extremely difficult 
to modify a joint custody order if, for example, one of the joint 
custodians is not carrying out his or her responsibilities or the 
parents are unable to agree. Additionally, if the original joint 
custody order was forcedlll or made at a time when the parents 
were hostile, continued hostility and disagreement may not con-
stitute a "change in circumstances" sufficient to terminate an 
unworkable joint custody arrangement. 
C. ADDmONAL PROVISIONS: NON-RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY 
1. AccountIng by CUstodial Parent 
Joint custody legislation in two states expands the rights of 
the noncustodial parent under a sole custody order. The noncus-
todial parent is given the unfettered power to challenge the cus-
todial parent's use of support payments and, in effect, her or his 
care of the child. Oregon's joint custody statute permits the 
court "at any time" to "require an accounting from the custo-
dian with reference to the use of the money awarded" for child 
support. 111 New York's 1981 joint custody legislation included a 
similar "accounting at any time" provision. 111 Neither provision 
requires that there be evidence of misuse of funds or neglect of 
the child. The accounting may be requested for a good reason, a 
bad reason or no reason at all. Furthermore, there is no provi-
sion regarding payment of attorneys' fees to defend such actions. 
This type of accounting provision creates the potential for 
abuse and harassment of the custodial parent. It invites viola-
120. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571.46.1(d) (Supp. 1981). See supro note 110 and 
accompanying text. But Bee N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B) (Supp. 1981) (permitting 
modification of a joint custody order upon the motion of one parent). 
121. See "Joint Custody Upon Request of One Party," IIUpro notes 62-65 and ac-
companying text. 
122. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1981). 
123. H. 2385, 204th Legis., 1981 Sess. (New York) (died); A. 4166, S. 3255, 204th 
Legis., 1981 Sess. (New York) (vetoed). See Appendix B. 
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tion of court orders of support and will produce litigation over 
small sums of money withheld and then disputed. Few custodial 
parents have the time or expertise to become "accountants" able 
to document each expenditure for the child. A noncustodial par-
ent seeking to minimize or evade a support order can repeatedly 
petition the court for an accounting. The custodial parent, faced 
with incurring attorneys' fees to defend the action, or worse, los-
ing custody because she cannot document or "justify" expendi-
tures, may agree to waive support rights (or arrearages) to end 
the harassment and legal proceedings. 
Moreover, this type of provision contradicts the court's un-
derlying assumption that the parent who has been awarded cus-
tody of the child is "fit" and will therefore adequately and prop-
erly provide for the child's needs. Accounting provisions 
presume the opposite. 
Accounting "at any time" provisions do not serve children's 
best interests. Seventy-five percent of child support orders and 
obligations are never met. I .. Five out of six AFDe families have 
an absent father, two-thirds of whom are categorized as sepa-
rated or divorced. III The increasing poverty of women and their 
children has been attributed to the failure of fathers to meet 
their support obligations: "Researchers have cited the growth in 
poverty rates for families headed by females and the shrinkage 
in poverty rates for those headed by males, mainly because wo-
men have been forced to support children alone and men have 
been relieved of this duty."I .. Accounting provisions only add to 
the ease with which child support obligations are already 
avoided, and further relegate children of divorce to poverty 
lifestyles. 
2. "No Removal 0/ Child From Family Home" Provision 
A joint custody bill introduced in New Jersey included a 
provision that: 
124. Women and Poverty, Women',luue, in Le,al Seruice. Practice, 14 CuAIuNo-
HOUD &Y. 1035, 1069-70 (1980-1981). 
125. BUUAU or THa CIIN8US, U.S. n.rr. or COMYBRCB, STA'I18TICAL ABlrntAcr or THa 
UNlTD STATa, 1978, at 361. 
126. Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What it HOI Meant Financially for Wo-
men in California, 1 FAIL Anv., Spring 1979, at 10, 15. 
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Unless the parents agree upon arrangements for 
physical custody of the child, the child may not 
be removed from the dwelling place which is the 
family home at the time one of the parents moves 
to another dwelling place to live separately, until 
the issue of custody of the child is determined as 
provided by law."' 
565 
Under this provision, pre-decree removal of the child could jeop-
ardize the right to custody by the removing parent. Additionally, 
the provision could be used by a parent to gain an advantage in 
a custody dispute by, for example, filing for custody while the 
child and other parent are away on vacation or following a week-
end or overnight trip. 
While the "no removal" provision has little nexus to joint 
custody issues, it has serious ramifications for battered women. 
As battered women's advocates in New Jersey testified: 
Our experience has been that maAy women have 
remained in the home to continue to be subjected 
to beatings because they have been misinformed 
by police that they cannot take their children 
with them.lll 
The vast majority of battered women will 
simply not leave home-or even consider leaving 
their home-if they cannot take their children 
with them. Equally frightening is the prospect of 
a parent not being permitted to remove his or her 
children from the home when the other parent is 
physically, psychologically, or sexually abusing 
one or more of the children. To enact this section 
lA. 1471] as law will cause the deaths of battered 
women and children. I •• 
The battered woman is placed in a "catch 22" by this type 
of provision: To leave could jeopardize her custody case since 
she would be violating the provision; to stay in a dangerous and 
127. A. 1471, A. 407, 198th Legis., 1980·1981 Seas. (N.J.). See also Bill No. 4-424, I 
2(b), 1981 Seas. (District of Columbia) (1982) (prohibiting removal "unless an immediate 
threat to the children exists, as evidenced by a past record of child abUlle"). See infra 
note 142 and accompanying text. . 
128. See N.J. Hearings. supra note 84. 
129. See N.J. Hearings. supra note 84 (testimony of Ellen Koteen. Vice President, 
New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women). 
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violent home may imply that she is unable to care for and pro-
tect herself and her children. 110 
The purpose of this uno removal" provIsion is unclear. It 
may represent an attempt to prevent child-snatching. If so, it is 
overbroad. A provision prohibiting removal from the jurisdic-
tion, rather than the family home, would address the child-
snatching problem without also endangering the safety and well-
being of abused wives and children. 
The provision may instead be an attempt to minimize the 
disruption of children's lives (school, neighborhood, friends) 
caused by the splitting of their parents and family. It is ques-
tionahle, however, whether keeping children in a home with two 
hostile and uwarring" parents is any less disruptive than a move 
to another residence. 
Interestingly, the.uno removal" provision seems to contra-
dict one of the basic tenets of joint custody. Joint custody em-
phasizes and, in fact, depends upon uflexibility" and the con-
stant moving of children between two homes. ••• However, the 
Uno removal" provision reverts to the traditional emphasis on 
the child's need for stability and continuity of a one home 
environment. III 
130. The California Supreme Court recently upheld the permanent removal of a 
child from both parents where the Cather had been convicted oC abusing the child. De-
spite evidence in the record that the mother and daughter maintained an intimate and 
caring relationship, the court Cound the mother passive and dominated by her husband, 
thus unable to protect the child from the Cather's continum, abuse. As the dissent 
pointed out: 
A finding that the mother WBI "too passive" in her relation-
ahip with her husband and the use of the finding to justify 
severance of the parent-child relationahlp raiaellOme serious 
queationa in a pluraliatic society where the relationahip be-
tween husband and wife may vary according to cultural 
background. 
In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 927, 623 P.2d 198, 209, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 648 (1981). 
131. Proponents claim that joint custody offen "flesibility" to parents by, Cor eum-
pie, relieving the BOle custodian of the full-time job oC childrearing. Advocatea Curther 
contend that this "flesibility" factor more than compenaatea for the disruption and con-
fusion joint custody causes in the child'a environment and should be esploited to the 
Culleat. See, e.g., Roman, The Dilpoaable Parent, CONCD.. Ore. Rsv., Dec. 1977, at 1. 
132. Theae facton have alwaya been paramount under the "best intereats" teat. 
"Stability in the human Cacton affecting a child's emotional liCe and development is ea-
sential." Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 699 (1950). 
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3. Access to Records Provision 
Several joint custody statutes and bills provide noncustodial 
parents with unrestricted access to all "records and information" 
pertaining to their children.· .. This may include medical, dental, 
school and psychiatric records. This provision is, in part, unnec-
essary since, under federal law,," noncustodial parents are al-
ready guaranteed access to their children's school records. 
This provision is extremely dangerous to battered women, 
children, and those persons and agencies who assist them such 
as families and shelters. There are no standards for limiting an 
abusive parent's right of access to these records. By exercising 
this right, an abusive noncustodial parent will be able to locate 
the child's residence and school, as well as the custodial parent's 
address of employment. Because the "right to access" is usually 
mandatory, it is unclear if the court may, in its discretion, limit 
access where there is evidence or a history of battering or child 
abuse .• 111 The "record access" provision in New York's 1981 joint 
custody bill·" was strongly opposed by battered women's advo-
cates."T As a result, the bill was amended to deny access to nOD-
custodial parents where protection orders were in effect, or to. 
parents whose rights had been terminated or who had been ad-
judicated abusive or neglectful.1aa However, as advocates pointed 
out, these amendments were not only insufficient to protect vic-
tims, but exhibited the Legislature'S lack of understanding and 
consideration of the problems faced by battered women and 
133. "[A]ccesa to recorda and information pertaining to a minor child, including but 
not limited to medical, dental and achool recorda, ,hall not be denied to a parent be-
cause such parent ill not the child'. custodial parent." CAL. CIV. CoDE § 46OO.5(g) (West 
Supp. 1982) (emphaaill added). See .tatutea in Florida, Idaho, Masaachusetts, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampahire; and lqialation in AJaaka, Connecticut, minoill, Miasouri, New 
Jersey and New York. (citatioDl in Appendicea A and B, col. C-4). 
134. The Family Education Right. and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit. 
V, § 513(a), 88 Stat. 671 (codified at 20 U.s.C. 112321 (1976». 
135. See Pennsylvania'. new .tatute, 1981 Pa. Laws No. 115 § 10(b), which espressly 
grants the court dilCretionary power to deny access, and § 10(c) which forbids the court 
from ordering "that the addreaa of a shelter for battered spouses and their dependent 
children or otherwise confidential records of a domestic violence counselor be dillclosed 
to the defendant or hie counael or any party to the proceeding." 
136. S. 3256, A. 4166, 204th Legia., 1981 Seas. (New York) (vetoed). 
137. NEW YORK &rAft GoVERNOR'S TASK FORCB ON DoMBSTIC VIOLBNCB, COALmON 
FOR ABUSBD WOMBN, INc., LBoAL AcnON ON DoWBSTlC VIOLENCB (1980). 
138. S. 3256B, A. 4166B, 204th Legia. 1981 Seas. (New York) (introduced Feb. 23, 
1981) (amending N.Y. Do ... RBL. LAw § 240). 
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children. 
Although the [amendments] represent an attempt 
to cure an obvious defect allowing access to a 
shelter or safe home, it requires an adjudication 
and does not contemplate the myriad of cases 
where no formal abuse, neglect or parental termi-
nation or protective order proceeding has occured. 
Specifically it ignores the many child abuse and 
neglect cases opened by child protective agencies 
and not brought to court because of inartful col-
lection of necessary evidence, or a lack of staff 
and services. Further, it does not include the 
many abuse cases where children recant their ini-
tial testimony on the discovery that their removal 
from the home will be the outcome and therefore 
the abuse petitions are dismissed. Moreover, the 
new protective orders amendment fails to con-
sider violent families where orders have lapsed, 
been dismissed on consent, were never requested 
. . . . Thus access to the shelter location is still 
permitted in all of the above instances. I .. 
The practical effect of record-access provisions is confused 
by the extremely broad scope of information available under 
them. The provision makes accessible not only "records," but 
any "information pertaining to the child. "1.0 However, the lan-
guage of the provision makes clear that a noncustodial parent's 
right to access applies only if the denial of access is based solely 
on status, i.e., that he or she is a noncustodial parent. Thus, the 
right of access guaranteed by this provision does not, and should 
not, apply when denial is based on other recognized reasons or 
rights of custodial parents and children, such as constitutional 
rights of privacy or statutory rights (e.g., physician-patient 
privilege). 
4. "Minimum Visitation" Requirement 
South Carolina's 1980 joint custody legislation included the 
provision that "[iJn no case may the courts grant any less access 
to the child to the noncustodial parent than forty-eight hours 
139. Letter from Meg O'Regan-Cronin, Esq., Executive Director, Coalition for 
Abused Women, Inc. to Governor's Counsel's Office (June 10, 1981) (recommending veto 
of joint custody bill). 
140. See supra note 133. 
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per week, one-half of all school holidays and forty-five days dur-
ing the summer unless there is a proven threat of physical harm 
to the child. "141 
This provision constitutes a complete abandonment of the 
"best interest" standard. It cannot be presumed that such a 
rigid formula is in most or every child's best interests. Because 
the provision only permits limitation of visitation when there is 
a threat of physical harm to the child, those children who are 
psychologically and emotionally abused by the noncustodial par-
ent will be subject to the visitation prescribed by the provi-
sion.14I Further, the requirement that threats of physical harm 
be "proven" does not take into account the difficulty of proving 
child abuse.1f8 The only "proof' in many cases will be the custo-
dial parent's allegations of abuse or threats of abuse. Since this 
parent is the moving party seeking limitations on visitations 
these allegations may be viewed by the court as suspect. I" 
The provision, by permitting deviation only when there is a 
threat of physical abuse to the child, fails to recognize that it is 
not in a child's best interests to have frequent and continuing 
contact with a parent who abuses the other parent.lfe Husbands 
who batter their wives are, under the provision, guaranteed fre· 
quent and continuing access to their victims. The statute es-
pressly forbids courts from exercising their discretion 80 as to 
protect battered wives and their children. 
Under this legislation, the custodial parent's needs and 
schedule become subservient to the dominant visitation rights of 
141. H. 3248, 1979-1980 Seas. (South Carolina) (empbaais added). See AppendU B. 
142. Generally, courts have the power to limit or suspend visitation when It endan-
gers the child's physical, mental or emotional health. See e.g., Wrs. STAT. § 247_24& 
(1981). 
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
144. In a 1977 Louisville, Kentucky cue, Mimi Jolicour loet custody of her five-
year-old daughter to her ex-husband when she sought to terminate his visitation righta 
because of evidence he was sexually molesting the child. Besides Ms. Jolicour's teeti-
mony, there was supporting testimony by two doctors who treated the child. Not only 
did the judge not believe Ms. Jolicour, but he transferred IOle custody to the father mel 
forbade Ms. Jolicour from visiting or communicating with the child. Henry, Father Mo-
lests Child; Gets ClUtody. em Oua BACKS, March 1980; Who', Minding Fatherf, 
PLEXUS. Dec. 1980 at 9, col. 1. 
145. See supra text accompanying note 84. Battered woman's advocates describe 
children of violent homes as haviDg "the feelings of instability and insecurity of childreD 
who have sustained trauma." N.J. Hearing" supra note 84. 
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the noncustodial parent. No provision is included whereby the 
custodial parent can force the noncustodial parent to exercise 
these "rights," yet interference with this rigid schedule by the 
custodial parent may result in a loss of custody. Nor is the eco-
nomic impact of this provision addressed in the legislation. If 
the noncustodial parent lives or moves out of state, the custodial 
parent may have to share the costs of this "right." 
This provision is an extreme example of legislators' unprec-
edented concern for, and protection of, the rights of the noncus-
todial parents-over and above the needs and best interests of 
either the child or the parent responsible for the day-to-day care 
of the child. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Legal and mental health authorities generally concur that 
joint custody is only appropriate when both parents want the 
arrangement and are able to cooperate in joint decisionmaking. 
Such cases are in the minority, and those parents will have an 
informal joint custody arrangement regardless of court order. 
Thus, the current legislation is directed at, and would largely 
affect, those parents who are not in agreement. These are the 
very cases which experts agree are unsuitable for joint custody 
and where, in fact, it would be detrimental to the child's best 
interests. 
Ostensibly, joint custody equalizes the rights and responsi-
bilities of childraising between parents. This is not, however, the 
intent or effect of the legislation now being introduced across 
the country. Instead, this legislation serves to expand the rights 
of the parent who is not responsible for the day-to-day job of 
raising children. The non-caretaking parent is given "equal" 
rights or control when he/she does not contribute equally to the 
day-to-day care and support of the child, either pre-divorce or 
post-divorce. Further, forced legal joint custody only serves to 
interfere with the primary caretaker's ability to make the deci-
sions needed to carry out her responsibilities to the child. 
The current joint custody trend is, in effect, an attack on 
women who have been, and wish to continue to be, the primary 
caretakers of their children. Their past assumption of the daily 
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care and responsibility for children is denied any value or credit. 
The current joint custody trend will not lead to equality be-
tween the sexes. Sexism does not end when women lose rights or 
lose custody of their children. Forced joint custody, like forced 
sterilization and forced pregnancy, is a denial of women's right 
to control their lives. 
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APPENDIX A:. JOINT CUSTODY STATUTES (as of March 1982) 
A. Typ. of JaiItt B.~I~ C. Addiliotwl 1'rovUiDIu: 
STATFJCrrB Oat. fUICod)', Stal"'f l:'i CUIC~."'" N_,""'''' fO "eN, Cuol. Otltn BMcted I. 2. 3. 4- I. 2. 3. 4. I. 2. 3. 4. 
i AIuz. Rav. STAT. AInI. 1981 I I I .' I I I I I I I 25-332 (19811 s.u. lor CL of Mario '- ... ..tcJDU iaint cuotody (6 FLR 23831. 
r 
CAL CIv. Coos II 4600, 1980 • • • " • • • 
mod/tenD of joint cuttody Older ~ reo 
46OO.5~W .. Supp, 1982) quat of .... or both _18 
CoNH. Gao. STAT. AInI. f 46b-56(.) 1981 • 
.' • " • 
'court may Older joint lop) only per par. 
(SuDI'. 1982 A 1982 _. Supp.) tiee_t 
FLA. STAT. ANN. f 61.13(2)(bl eff. 
.' 
'obarecI cuotody unIeoe ftndi.,. of cletri· 
(Weat. Suoo. 1982) 7/1/82 • • • meat 
IlAWAD Rav. STAT. f 571-48, 1980 • • • 
.....t/tenn of joint c:uotody Older ~ re-
10 46.1 (Supp. 1981) quat of .... -' or court'. own motion 
IDAHO eo .. Atno. f 32-717 UI82 • • 
.' • • .pr.p .......... of ewIcIenee etandud (8uDP. 1982) 
IOWA eo.. AInI. 1l18li.21.6 1m • (Walt 19811 
KAN. STAT. Atno. f 1IO-1610(b) 1l1'7li • 
"both partiee '-e eq...t r\chta .............. -
(8uDP. 1981) _biBtioo-
Ky. Rav. STAT. Atno. 1 403.270(3) liIIO • (Suao. 19801 
LA. CIY. eo.. ANN. art. 146-147 1982 ,,' .partiee muat both be domiciled in alate (W .. SUPP. 1982) 
Ma. Rav. STAT. Atno. tA. 19, 1981 
" II 214 752 IWMt Suoo. 1981) 
M-. Go... Law. elL 299, f 31 'awarda permitlad in ~ with par. I 
(to be codified .t MAss. GEN. 1981 ,,' 
.' " enta' ..- ....... find;'" 01 not in LA •• ANN. f cb. 2011. I 31) best inte ....... 
MICH. eo .... LAws ANN. 
I 722.23<6a1 1980 
" " " " " " 
child aupport provisiona 
(Supp. 1981) 
MINN. STAT. ANN. II 518.003, 1981 
" 
".bility 01 perenta 10 cooperate" ractor 518.17 (West Suon. 1982) 
MORT. eo"" ANN. f 40-4-222 to 1981 
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APPENDIX. A (Continued) 
NEV. REV. STAT. f 125.140 1981 s !J981) s s s s 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 1981 s s s s s s (Supp. 1981) 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4.9.1 1981 s (SIIJ!P, 1981) s s s 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5O-13.2(b) 
1967 s (SIIJ!P, 1981) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3109.04 (PII2e SuPP. 1981) 1981 s· 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1) 
1977 s (1981) 
1981 Pa. Laws No. 115 (to be 
codified at Po. CON. STAT. 1982 s s s s s 
ANN . ...l23.1001-_10015 (Purdon) 
TEx. FA ... CODE ANN. § 14.06 
1979 s (Vernon 1974 & Sllpp. 1982) 
WIS. STAT. 
1978 s § 247.24(1)(b) (1981) 
-- -
KEY: 
A. TYPE OF JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE (See test pp. 545 to 553). 
1. Option 
2. Option Only When Parties in Agreement 
3. Upon Request of One Party 
4. PreferencelPresumption 
B. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODY-RELATED (See test pp. 553 to 563). 
1. "Friendly Parent" Provision 
2. Evidentiary Standardo 
3. Mandatory Writing for Denial of Joint Cuotody 
4. Modification" At Any Time" ProvisIon 
C. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: NON-RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY (See test pp. 563 to 570). 
1. Accounting Provisions 
2. "No Removal" of Child From Home 
3. Access to Recordo Provisiono 
4. uMinimum Visitation" Requirement 
s 
s 
joint I_I without joint phywieaJ 
·10 months tn.1 period required 
s I 
s· 
·prohibits diocl""ure of battered women.o\ 
ohelter addreooeo and counoeloro 
I 
I 
joint cuotody "meano equal fi«:hts and re- I 
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APPENDIX B: JOINT CUSTODY LEGISLATION (Status as of March 1982) 
A. Ty~ of Joint B. Additional Prouuiona: C. Additional Prouuiono: 
BILL # SESSION STATUS rutod)l Statut Joi t CUlt dy-Rd tH Non- .latH 0 Joi,. Cu.t. OTHER (explain' 
I. 2. 3. 4. I. 2. 3. 4. I. 2. 3. 4. 
HB 210, 1981· P ROIlen-Hess 1982 X X X X X x 
HB 52, 1981 D To exemption provision Sherman x 
AB 1706, 1982 P x· x • Joint legal aM joint pbyxical only Kapilof x x x x 
AB 2202, 1982 P Joint '-'!phyxical defined Imbrecht x x x X X x 
AB 2197, 1980 D Imbrecht 1981 x x x " " 
lIB 3480, 1980 D LepJ reoidence cIeoipation Epland 1981 
SB 123, 
1981 F O'LearY " " " " 
HB 6464, 1981 F MoaJey " " " 
SB 983, 1981 F Smitll " " " 
lIB 4-424 1982 P ". 
·ddrimmt fimIinI; no child oupport 
Ray • " " " • " " ...... ioInt cuotadY OIdend 
HB 1440, 19110 Gordan D " 
HB ISO· 1981 D 
" 
·~.7FLR7m4 
SB 1262, 1982 D 
" Judie. Com. " " • " 
Joint IepI without joint phyaical 
HB 0665, 1981 P Catania 1982 " 
HB 3405, 1980 F 
YOUN[ " " 
x 
HB 2706 (Am.) 
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STATE RILL # SESSION STATUS 
1. 
KY HB «8, 1982 P s· Guenthner 
LA HB 1691. 1980 . F Byrnes 1981 s 
MD SB 398. 1982 P Boc=r 
MD HB 1296. 1982 F Hughes 
MD HB 1418 1982 F s 
MD SB 1771960. 1982 F WelBh 
MD SB 755. 1982 F s Curnn 
MD HB 352, 198C D Shapiro 1981 s 
MA H 3013. 1982 P Hicks 
MA H 2631/86172 1980 F Denucci 
MA H 18771S2I117 1980 F Vimeau 
MA H42011S2059. 1980 F LeClair 
MN SB 1569. 1982 P Johnson 
MO HB 44. Christian 1981 D " 
MO HB 1132. Christian 1982 P s 
MO SB 683. 1982 P Wbarins 
~--
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
A. TylW 0/ Joinl B. Additiona / f>roIUio ... : 
~ ... tody Stotut Joi t Cuot dy-Re/ ted 
2- 3. 4. 1. 2- 3. 4. 
s 
s s s 's s s 
s s s 
s 















C. AdditioN" Proci.io ... : 
Non- e/otrd 0 Join Cu.t. 
1. 2- 3. 4. 
s 
OTHER lesplainl 
·"Joint .... tady ohall be libenlly 
l(l"allted" 
Joint legal without joint phyoical 
• Joint IepJ onlY 
·"oint IepJ on\)' 
'Reported et 8 FLR 2278 
Joint IepJ without joint phyoiad 
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A 122. 1982 P Visotchkv 
f NJ 
A 407. 1980 • F 
Paolella 1981 
NJ A 1471. 1980 • F Visotchky 1981 
NY S ~/A 10721. 1982 Vetoed Luher 
NY A 41661S 3255. Luber 1981 Vetoed • 
NY A 9369/S 7964. 1980 D • Lasher 
NY H 2385. 1981 D Behan 
OH 
HB 1076. 1979 . F 
BovIe 1980 
OR HB 2538. 
1979 • D Ridwda 1980 
PA S 141. 
1980 • D Furno 1981 
PA HB 2394. 1980 D MeKeIJey 
PA S 1282. 1980 D Gekaa 
RI SB 1023. 1979 D CoateUo 
SC H 3248. 
1979 • D Bradley 1980 
TX HB 1508. 1981 D • GiUey 
SB 3248. 
1981 • 
WA Haley amend P 
1982 
---- ---
APPENDIX 8 (Continued) 
A. Ty~ of Joint B. AddU;"",,1 ProuUiDIu: 
ulod~ Slalul Joi " CuI rdy-R~I IH 
2. 3- 4. I. 2. ' 3. 4. 
• • • • • 
• x • 
• • • • 
• • " 
•• • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • 
• • 
• " • • 
• • • • 
• • • • • " 
• • 
• • • • • 
• 
c. AtUiliotuJl I'rouuu.n.: 
Non· dalH 0 Joi", Cut. 












,·"Re...nabl. and juot" standard 
Joint IepJ without joint phyoical 
Child IUPport pnm.HIDI 
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KEY: 
A. TYPE OF JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE (See test pp. 64& to 65.'11. 
I. Option . 
2. Option Only When Parties In Apeement 
3. Upon Request of One Party 
4. PreCerence/Presumption 
B. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODY·RELATED (See \eSt pp. 65.1 to 56.11. 
\. "Friendly Parent" Provision 
2. Evidentiary Standards 
3. Mandatory Writi", Cor Denial of Joint CUBl<Jdy 
4. Modification" At Any Time" Provision 
C. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: NON·RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY (See test pp. 56.1 to 5701. 
\. Ac:countin« Provisions 
2. "No RemoVal" of Child From Home 
3. Acxeu to Recorda Provisions 
4. "Minimum Visitation" Requirement 
"STATUS KEY:" 
P-pendillll 
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